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Abstract
In this paper I will argue that Regan’s subjects-of-a-life account is epistemically 
irresponsible. Firstly, in making so many epistemic claims. Secondly in making the 
claims themselves.
Introduction
I will assess the epistemic responsibility of Regan’s account. A lot depends on 
whether a being is an experiencing subject-of-a-life. I will look at the capacities 
required to be a subject-of-a-life and then assess Regan’s epistemic responsibility as 
a whole. 
I. Beliefs and Desires
Stich argues we cannot say what animals’ beliefs are and if beliefs are necessary for 
desires we cannot know what desires animals have (1979, pp. 17-18). Infallible 
knowledge of the mental states of others is not possible. However, we do manage 
relative certainty with humans including those who do not use language. We ascribe 
beliefs and desires to small children. Also we do know that when the dog believes it 
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is dinnertime or that there is food in the bowl. Until a relevant difference can be 
shown with animals the burden of proof lies with Stich.
Related to beliefs are concepts. It has been thought animals lack concepts because 
they lack language (Aristotle 1986, 428a; Fellows 2000, p. 593; Leahy 1991, p. 79). 
Some do argue that animals possess concepts even though they lack language 
(Regan 1983, p. 74; Rollin 1992, p. 48). However, animals’ behaviour makes it 
reasonable to think they have concepts: “animals do anticipate and remember… 
that… is how they learn” (Rollin 1989, p. 50). There is other evidence animals 
possess simple concepts. Pigeons “can learn to categorise slides depending on 
whether those slides contain a triangle or not, or depending on whether they contain 
a human” (Carruthers 1992, p. 131). Vervet monkeys use different alarm calls for 
different predatory species (Ristau 1992, p. 130). Alex the parrot must have some 
comprehension of “same” and “different” as he can compare shapes and colours and 
answer with the category name. He is performing with new objects and colours so 
he cannot simply be remembering the answers (Ristau 1992, p. 130). Chimpanzees 
appear to understand “middle object” something “many three- and four-year-old 
children, though accomplished language users, cannot” (Singer 1986a, p. 302).
II. Welfare interests and An Individual Welfare In The 
Sense That Their Experiential Lives Fare Well Or Ill For 
Them, Logically Independently Of Their Utility For 
Others And Logically Independently Of Their Being The 
Object Of Anyone Else’s Interests
That animals have a welfare is uncontroversial (Dawkins 1980, p. 10; DeGrazia 
1996, p. 211; Frey 1980, p. 79; Leahy 1991, p. 43; Regan 1983, p. 88, p. 95; Singer 
1995; VanDeVeer 1979, p. 57). Entire books have been written about animal welfare 
(Palmer and Paterson 1989; Spedding 2000). In order to have a welfare animals 
must be able to be benefited and/or harmed (Bernstein 1998, p. 13; Regan 1982b, p. 
108). In order to have experiential welfare of the kind Regan implies animals must 
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be conscious. For their experience to fare well or ill for them they must be 
experiencing their lives; they must be conscious of them. In the next section I will 
argue animals are conscious. Animals do have a welfare and so welfare interests.
III. Perceptions and consciousness
Perceptions are the basis of our comprehension of the world around us. That most 
animals have some perceptions of the world around them will strike most as 
obvious. Many agree some animals can perceive (Aristotle 1986, 415a11; 428a10; 
1986, 434b; Locke 1975; Pegis 1948, p. 33; Scruton 2000, p. 9-10). Though some 
think animals cannot perceive (Frey 1980, pp. 118-120; Leahy 1991, p. 148).
The only time Regan mentions perception is when he is explaining what a subject-of-
a-life is (1983, p. 243). What he means by perceptions is not altogether clear. I take 
him to mean conscious awareness of the world around (see for example 2004, p. 
54). It is consciousness not self-consciousness is required to be a subject-of-a-life 
(1983, p. 243, 2001, p. 201, 2004, p. 46).
III a. Definitions of consciousness
One of the few things those working on consciousness (both philosophers and 
scientists) seem to agree on is that it is all but impossible to explain it (Dawkins 
1998, p. 4; DeGrazia 1996, p. 101; Gorman 1997, p. C5; Greenfield 1995, p. 196; 
Griffiths 1999, p. 117, 118; Leahy 1991, p. 109; Page 2001, pp. 43-4; Pinker 1997, p. 
146; St Augustine 1961, p. 264; Sutherland 1989). Despite this there have been many 
attempts (Dawkins 1980, p. 24, 1998, p. 5; Flanagan 1992, p. 31; Griffin 1976, p. 5; 
Hubbard 1975; Humphrey 1978; Nagel 1974, p. 438; Natsoulas 1978, p. 910; Scruton 
2000, p. 177; Shallice 1978, p. 117; Walker 1983, p. 383).
It is usually defined as being aware in some way (Dawkins 1998, p. 5; Flanagan 
1992, p. 31; Natsoulas 1978, p. 910; Scruton 2000, p. 177; Walker 1983, p. 383). The 
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normal definition is Nagel’s: a “conscious experience… means, basically, that there 
is something it is like to be that organism… something it is like for the 
organism” (1974, p. 436). He says “the essence of the belief that bats have 
experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat” (1974, p. 438). This is 
a common sense understanding and one Regan could agree to (see DeGrazia 1996, 
p. 115). 
III b. Are animals conscious?
Some doubt whether we can know if animals are conscious in any sense (Dennett 
1996, p. 18). Many argue animals are conscious (E.g.: Barrs 1997 p. 33 (says the 
scientific community agree animals are conscious); Carruthers 1992, p. 184; Darwin 
2004; Deacon 1997, p. 442; Edelman 1992; Flanagan 1992, pp. 142-5; Fox 1986, p. 
4, 72 (thinks even animals like fish and reptiles possess some limited 
consciousness); Frey 1980, p. 108; Griffin 1976, p. 104, 1991, p. 15, 2003, p. 106; 
Lehman 1998, p. 315; Midgley 1983, p. 11; Miller 2000 (thinks “[a]lmost every 
member of the American Philosophical Association would agree… all mammals are 
conscious, and… all conscious experiences is of some moral significance” (2000, p. 
443); Nagel 1974, p. 436; Narveson 1987, p. 32; Rodd 1990, p. 28; Ryder 1975, p. 9; 
Scruton 2000, p. 21; Searle 1998, pp. 49-50; Singer 1995; Sprigge 1979, pp. 119-120; 
Wise 2000). Most agree mammals are conscious (Baars 1997, pp. 27-33; Carruthers 
1992, p. 184; Edelman 1992; Frey 1980, p. 108; Nagel 1974; Regan 1983; Scruton 
2000, p. 21; Wise 2000, p. 141). Some think birds are (Edelman 1992; Sprigge 1979, 
pp. 119-120). Some think reptiles are (Edelman 1992; Fox 1986, p. 4, 72). Others 
think all vertebrates are (Flanagan 1992, pp. 142-5). Some limit consciousness to 
anthropoid apes (and maybe dolphins) (Bermond 2003, p. 79).
III c. Regan’s argument that animals are consciously aware
Whether animals are consciously aware has received much attention (E.g.: Dol et al. 
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1997; Frey 1980; Lehman 1998; Carruthers 1989; 1992; Pluhar 1995; Robinson 
1992; Rollin 1989; Singer 1995). Descartes infamously said animals are automata 
and not aware of anything – sights, sounds, smells, heat, cold, fear or pain 
(Descartes 1989). Regan has several arguments for animal consciousness (1983, 
2003, 2004). 
III c (i) Analogy – humans are conscious
The only consciousness of which any of us can be absolutely sure is our own. If we 
think other humans are conscious because they are like us (see below) the same can 
be said about animals (Dawkins 1998, p. 12; Griffin 1976, p. 85, 2003, p. 111; Singer 
1986a, p. 285; Sprigge 1979, p. 119; Walker 1983, p. 339; Wise 2000, p.). The 
argument from analogy is especially strong in the case of the great ages who have 
very similar DNA and brains (Walker 1983, p. 339; Wise 2000, p. 132). The analogy 
in the case of other animals is not as strong as in the case of humans – animals 
differ more – but that animals are sufficiently similar to us to in some ways makes it 
likely they are conscious. Dawkins argues it is parsimonious to describe animal 
behaviour as conscious because if we think animals are not conscious we have to 
allow other humans may not be either. Special arguments are needed to show 
similar behaviour requires differential explanations (1998, p. 176).
III c (ii) Common sense
It is a common sense belief that animals are aware (Regan 1983, p. 25, 2004, p. 54; 
Rollin 1992, p. 56). Compelling reasons must be given against a common sense 
belief before it is reasonable to abandon it. The point of appealing to common sense 
is to put the burden of proof on those who deny it. 
III c (iii) The way we talk about animals
The way we talk about animals suggests they are conscious, insofar as we talk about 
them having wants (Regan 1983, p. 25, 2004, p. 55). Indeed, according to the 
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“psychologist Hebb… we simply could not deal with animals if our license to talk in 
these terms [of consciousness] were revoked” (Rollin 1992, p. 56). When Hebb and 
his associates used language that did not attribute mental states like fear, hate etc. 
they found it impossible to describe what animals were doing (1946).
III c (iv) Behaviour 
Some animals’ behaviour is relevantly similar to ours (Regan 2004, p. 55). Griffin 
argues when animals’ behaviour is complex we often conclude it is accompanied by 
conscious thinking (1989, p. 51). When animals’ behaviour is adaptable this suggests 
they are consciously thinking (1989, p. 52). That animals’ behaviour often involves 
complex patterns suggests they are thinking rather than responding mechanically, 
especially when the steps taken vary (1989, p. 53). Animals’ ability to adapt to novel 
and challenging situations is good evidence for conscious thought, therefore a 
“criterion of conscious awareness in animals is versatile adaptability of behaviour to 
changing circumstances and challenges” (1989, p. 54). For example a raven “picked 
up small rocks in its bill and dropped them at the human intruders” (1989, p. 54). 
Similarly, that “intention movements so often evolve into communicative signals 
may reflect a close linkage between thinking and the intentional communication of 
thoughts from one conscious animal to another” (1989, p. 55). For example, Vervet 
monkeys react differently to different alarm calls of their conspecifics which indicate 
different predators (Griffin 1989, pp. 56-7, 1976, p. 85).
III c (v) Bodies and brains
Some animals’ bodies are relevantly similar to ours i.e. similar anatomy and 
physiology (DeGrazia 1996, p. 104; Regan 1983, p. 18, 2004, p. 56). Animals have 
similar brains and nervous systems: 
Conscious awareness… is thought to require coordination between 
the medial temporal lobes of the brain, which includes the 
hippocampus and its supporting structure, and the cortex. The brains 
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of all mammals have both (Wise 2000, p. 141).
Ryder argues consciousness “is a function of the central nervous system” thus it 
reasonable to assume those animals with similar central nervous systems to us are 
conscious (1975, p. 9).
Lord Brain, an eminent neurologist said “the diencephalon is well developed in 
(vertebrates) animals and birds, I… cannot doubt that the interest and activities of 
animals are correlated with awareness and feeling in the same way as my 
own” (quoted in Ryder 1975, p. 10).
There is “[p]hysiological evidence of brain functions that are correlated with 
conscious thinking” (Griffin 2003, p. 111). There is no good evidence there is a part 
of the human brain (that only humans have) that is responsible for consciousness 
(DeGrazia 1996, p. 114; Dennett 1991, Ch. 5). Instead, available evidence suggests 
consciousness is associated with complex central nervous systems (CNSs) if this is 
right vertebrates and possibly cephalopods (octopi, squid and cuttlefish) are 
conscious (Flanagan 1992, pp. 142-5). Similarly, there are no fundamental 
differences between the brains and nervous systems of humans and other 
vertebrates (Griffin 1976, p. 104; Rodd 1990, p. 28). It, is therefore reasonable to 
think, at least, all vertebrates are conscious.
III c (vi) Evolutionary theory and consciousness
We share the same evolutionary origins as many animals (Regan 1983, p. 18, 2004, 
p. 57). Darwin says “the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, 
great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind” (2004, p. 151). Regan argues:
Natura non facit saltum (nature does not make jumps) is central to 
his [Darwin’s] understanding of how existing species of life, including 
the human, have come into being. Evolutionary theory teaches that 
what is more mentally complex evolves from what is less mentally 
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complex, not that what is more mentally complex, the human mind in 
particular, springs full-blown from what lacks mind altogether (2003, 
p. 35).
Many agree the differences between humans and animals are in degree (DeGrazia 
1996, p. 104; Gallup 1977, p. 311; Hebb 1946, p. 104; Regan 1982c, p. 159; Rollin 
1992, p. 56). Matthews makes a similar point: “By ‘the unity of psychology’… the 
psychology of human beings is part of the psychology of animals generally” (1978, p. 
437). Plato and Aristotle both accepted this principle (Plato 1975, 81d-82b; 2000, 
90e-91c, Aristotle 1986, B3). If we assume humans are conscious given evolutionary 
theory it would be remarkable humans alone are conscious (Regan 1983, p. 18). As 
Page puts it “[t]hose who hold doubts about consciousness and emotions for 
animals must explain how it is that these attributes arrive in the natural history of 
Homo sapiens like a bolt of lightning with no precursors in the animal world” (2001, 
p. 214). (Though it may be that humans have a degree of self-consciousness, though 
not unique, is much less developed in other species.)
Consciousness has survival value (DeGrazia 1996, p. 104, pp. 113-4; Griffin 1976, p. 
85; Page 2001, p. 217; Regan 1983, p. 19; Rodd 1990, p. 54; Singer 1986a, p. 286; 
Weiskrantz 1988, pp. 183-99; Wise 2000, p. 132). Consciousness helps its bearers 
survive by increasing their ability to deal with complicated and novel circumstances 
(DeGrazia 1996, p. 104; Griffin 1989, p. 57). Consciousness is economical (Griffin 
1989, p. 58). One reason consciousness may help animals survive is that it enables 
them to learn about their environment (Scruton 2000, p. 183). As Popper put it 
consciousness “allows our hypotheses to die in our stead” (quoted in Page 2001, p. 
217).
These reasons make a strong cumulative case for animal consciousness (Regan 
1983, p. 28). Regan argues mammals are clear cases of conscious animals (1983, p. 
29). However, all the evidence that suggests mammals are conscious suggests 
vertebrates (and possibly cephalopods) are. By ignoring this evidence Regan is being 
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epistemically irresponsible.
III d. Objections to animal consciousness
Many think animals lack conscious awareness. Bermond thinks pain and suffering 
are conscious experiences which require a developed prefrontal cortex and a right 
neocortical hemisphere and only humans, anthropoid apes and maybe dolphins 
therefore experience suffering (i.e. consciousness) (2003, p. 79). And Walker thinks 
only language users are conscious (1983, p. 387) (also see Carruthers 1989, 1992; 
Descartes 1989; Harrison 1989, p. 90; Leahy 1991; Malcolm 1977; Vendler 1972; 
Walker 1983, p. 387). However, most people agree at least mammals and probably 
higher vertebrates are conscious. Nowadays to hold no animals are conscious 
“requires some awkward intellectual gymnastics” (Midgley 1983, p. 11). I will 
examine these gymnastics below.
III d (i) Conscious versus Non-conscious
Carruthers is one of the few modern philosophers who thinks animals lack 
consciousness so I will concentrate on his arguments. He argues:
Animals are… often conscious, in the sense… they are aware of the 
world around them and of the states of their own bodies. Animals can 
be awake, asleep, dreaming, comatose, or partly conscious… They can 
be conscious or fail to be conscious, of an acrid smell, a loud noise… 
just as we can. (1992, p. 184)
This implies animals are conscious. So what does Carruthers mean when he objects 
to animal consciousness? Carruthers draws a distinction between two kinds of 
mental state: conscious and non-conscious (1992, p. 170). He thinks all animals’ 
mental states are non-conscious. An example of a non-conscious experience is 
driving while not being aware what one is doing – if one negotiates a parked car yet 
has no recollection of so doing (1992, pp. 170-1). Non-conscious experiences do not 
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feel like anything. 
Carruthers thinks animals’ non-conscious experiences work something like 
blindsight in humans. (For further discussion of blindsight see: DeGrazia 1996, p. 
105, p. 113; Flanagan 1992, p. 141; Nikolinakos 1994, p. 100. Harrison suggests 
animal experiences are all non-conscious (1991)). Humans suffer from blindsight 
where they have lost “conscious experience of an area of their visual field… they 
nevertheless have non-conscious experiences that are somehow made available to 
help in the control of their actions” (1992, p. 172). When a human has blindsight:
the visual information is, in a sense, available to be thought about 
(since if asked to guess what is there, subjects will generally guess 
correctly), it is not apt to give rise to spontaneous thoughts in the 
way… conscious experiences are. In the normal course of events the 
blindsight person will have no thoughts whatever about objects 
positioned in the blind portion of their visual field. (1992, p. 183)
Thus, for Carruthers, “not all experiences are conscious” (1992, p. 173). But what 
would other experiences (non-conscious ones) be like? Are they really experiences 
in any recognisable sense? Similarly, Bermond thinks“[i]t would be nonsensical to 
talk of experiences if those experiences failed to reach the domain of 
consciousness” (2003, p. 79). Dennett says an unconscious act is “[l]ike nothing; it 
is not part of your experience” (1996, p. 17). A non-conscious experience is not an 
experience.
Carruthers argues a conscious mental state is “one that is available to conscious 
thought – where a conscious act of thinking is itself an event that is available to be 
thought about similarly in turn” (1992, p. 180). To be conscious a being must have 
thoughts it is able to think about. Carruthers might mean by conscious thought what 
is normally meant by self-consciousness (DeGrazia makes a similar point 1996, p. 
115).
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Carruthers says:
Granted that animals can be conscious of events, our question is 
whether those states of awareness are, themselves, conscious ones. 
Our question is not, whether animals have mental states but whether 
animals are subject to conscious mental states. (1992, p. 184)
He acknowledges that animals are conscious in the normal understanding of 
consciousness. Animals have conscious states but they are not subject to conscious 
mental states. There is no real distinction here. 
Carruthers thinks once he has established there is a distinction between conscious 
and non-conscious mental states it follows that animals’ experiences are of the non-
conscious variety (because they cannot think about their thoughts) (1992, p. 184). 
This is an extremely bizarre way of describing consciousness. This is not what we 
would ordinarily understand by it. When I stub my toe I think “owe my toe hurts” 
not “I am thinking owe my toe hurts”. The first description is what it is to be 
conscious of pain; you are aware it hurts. You do not need to think about being in 
pain to feel it.
Carruthers’ account fails to explain how babies can have feelings – does he really 
want to deny they are conscious? I doubt it. 
Carruthers admits his arguments are “controversial and speculative, and may well 
turn out to be mistaken” (1992, p. 192). Many object to Carruthers views (Bekoff and 
Jamieson 1991; DeGrazia 1996, p. 112-4; Lehman 1998, p. 316; Robinson 1992). And 
even he even his thesis is “too highly speculative to serve as a secure basis for moral 
practice” (1992, p. 194). Carruthers’ account is risky and so it should not be used as 
a basis for judging animal consciousness.
III d (ii) Language
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Many think language is necessary for conscious thought (Carruthers 1992, p. 183; 
Dennett 1996; Taylor 2003, p. 37). It may be that language provides a more 
sophisticated or intense sort of consciousness. The point is that language is not 
necessary for consciousness per se. Regan argues that in order for human infants to 
learn how to talk they must be preverbally and nonverbally aware or they could 
never learn a language (2004, pp. 67-8). If consciousness depends on language 
children cannot be aware of anything. This “makes utterly mysterious, at best, how 
children could learn to use a language” (1983, p. 15). If children can be conscious 
without language we cannot reasonably say animals cannot (1983, p. 16). Dennett 
thinks animals and pre-linguistic children lack consciousness (1995, p. 695, 703). 
But he needs to explain how children acquire language without consciousness. Some 
may object only those with potential for language are conscious. But it is not at all 
clear how the potential has any bearing.
Many argue language is not necessary for conscious thought (Dawkins 2003, p. 94; 
Grandin 2005, p. 262; Matthews 1978, p. 447; Walker 1983, p. 383). In addition 
there is proof that language is not required for conscious thought. Temple Grandin, 
who is autistic, thinks in pictures, not in words but few would deny she is conscious 
(2005, p. 262). Grandin says “Obviously I am conscious, even though I don’t think 
in words, so there is nothing to say an animal can’t be conscious just because an 
animal doesn’t think in words” (2005, p. 262). Grandin designs whole structures 
without a single word entering here head, she says, “words come in… after I’ve 
finished thinking it through” (2005, p. 17). When she talks to others she “translates” 
her pictures into words (2005, p. 18). Grandin is not alone. Einstein and Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge both thought (though not entirely) in pictures (Wise 2000, p. 159). 
There are deaf-mutes who say they were conscious before they acquired language 
and who thought in pictures and signs (Wise 2000, p. 160). Such people can relate 
their pre-linguistic experience (Walker 1983; Wise 2000, p. 160-1). It is hard to see 
how this would be possible if they were not conscious at the time of having the 
experiences. Ildefonso a deaf mute who was language-less herded goats and sheep, 
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harvested and planted sugarcane, slaughtered chickens, begged and worked on 
airplane parts before he learned sign language (Wise 2000, p. 160). Ildefonso only 
learned to use (sign) language late in his adult life yet he “was conscious, and he had 
no language at all” (Grandin 2005, p. 262). 
There is evidence animals think in pictures (Louie and Wilson 2001, p. 145-56). 
Researchers implanted electrodes into mice’s brains and taught them to run round a 
maze. They found the brain wave patterns were so precise they could see just what a 
mouse was doing at any given point. When the mice were in the REM phase of sleep 
they found the same pattern of brain waves as when the mice were running through 
the maze. Given that humans dream in pictures during REM sleep this is good 
evidence animals do too. If they dream in pictures it is reasonable to think they 
think in pictures when awake. 
III d (iii) Instinct
Some are sceptical of animal consciousness because they put all animal behaviour 
down to instinct. But there is nothing to say we cannot be aware of an instinct. Take 
sneezing for example (Page 2001, p. 213). 
III e. Degrees of consciousness
It is possible there are degrees of consciousness and animals have a lower degree of 
consciousness than humans (Griffin 1998, p. 5; Lehman 1998, p. 321; Page 2001, p. 
124; Wise 2000, p. 127). This is a problem for Regan because inherent value does 
not admit of degrees and nor does the criterion (being a subject-of-a-life) it is based 
on. It is very likely consciousness admits of degrees for as animals (and humans) 
develop it is unlikely that consciousness suddenly sparks into existence, rather it 
must come on gradually. There are likely to be differences in degrees of 
consciousness in fully developed individuals. A dog is conscious, but I am self-
conscious. This is a difference in degree. This undermines the categorical nature of 
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inherent value. If the criterion it is based on (consciousness is an aspect of being a 
subjects-of-a-life) comes in degrees it is hard to justify the categorical nature of 
inherent value.
III f. Differences in consciousness 
As well as different degrees of consciousness it is highly likely there are differences 
in content. Grandin believes animals perceive the world in a different way to most 
humans (Grandin is autistic and thinks autistic people perceive the world in a 
similar way to animals). All the details normal humans filter out make it into the 
consciousness of animals (and autistic people). Animals are conscious of details. 
Normal humans are not. Humans are “abstract in their seeing and hearing. Normal 
human beings are abstractified in their sensory perceptions as well as their 
thoughts” (2005, p. 30). Most humans process the information their senses take in 
into an abstract picture in their mind; normal humans see “their ideas of 
things” (2005, p. 30). Animals, and autistic people, just see the raw data, they do 
not process it in the same way. Animals “see the actual things themselves” (2005, p. 
30). Autistic people are more focused on details than whole objects (Minshew and 
Goldstein 1998). That people only see what they expect to is supported by work on 
inattentional blindness. For example, many people did not see a woman dressed as a 
gorilla when watching a basket ball game (Mack and Rock 1998). Thus, Grandin 
thinks, animals perceive the world in a totally different way to most humans. 
Two factors are involved in the different perceptions of humans and animals. First 
they sometimes have different sense organs that function more or less well; second 
they process the information in different ways (Grandin 2005, p. 59).
Many animals see things differently to normal humans, for example, most prey 
animals have panoramic vision (Grandin 2005, p. 40). Some animals see different 
colours and contrasts (Grandin 2005, p. 42). Different animals have different sense 
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organs and sensory abilities we don’t have and vice versa (Grandin 2005, p. 59). Our 
colour vision is much better than lots of animals. Dogs and cats have better hearing, 
bats and dolphins use sonar. Human and Old World primates have a poor ability to 
smell pheromones (Grandin 2005, p. 61).
Regan does not seem to be aware of the differences in perception; in the content of 
consciousness. Do these differences make a difference? Is all that matters that they 
are conscious? These are questions Regan needs to answer. 
IV. Memory
Regan argues it is reasonable to think animals have memories because it is 
reasonable to think they have preference-beliefs:
dogs are [not] born knowing how bones taste. To find this out, Fido… 
had to get his mouth on one… suppose the dog lacks memory… Fido 
could not form the preference-belief or behave as he does because of 
what he believes about the connection between the taste of the bones 
and satisfaction of his desires. (1983, p. 73)
There are some who deny animals can have memories. But most, myself included, 
agree that higher animals, at least, have memories (Aquinas thinks animals have 
memories (Pegis 1948); Darwin 2004, p. 95; Dawkins and Manning 1998, p. 256; 
DeGrazia 1996, p. 159; Fouts and Fouts 1993, p. 37-8; Grandin 2005, p. 263; 
Herman 1975, pp. 43-8; Herman and Thompson 1977, pp. 501-3; Page 2001, p. 177; 
Walker 1983, p. 78).
It is reasonable to think animals have memories because memory is adaptive in that 
it allows the animal to acquire new information (beyond instinct) about what is 
pleasant (helps survival) and unpleasant (dangerous). Memory has survival value 
for those that live long enough to benefit from it.
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Some might argue that memory is dependent on language. But babies have 
memories, for example, they remember the faces of their parents, so memory cannot 
be dependent on language. Humans must be able to remember without language or 
they could not learn a language (Rollin 1992, p. 50).
There is much physiological evidence animals have memories; they have “oxytocin 
[which] is the hormone that lets animals remember each other” (Grandin 2005, p. 
106). Similarly, the areas of the brain that are responsible for some parts of 
memory, such as the hippocampus are present in the brains of humans as well as 
animals including rats and pigeons (Dawkins and Manning 1998, p. 256; Walker 
1983, pp. 320-5).
There is evidence animals have both short-term and long-term memories (Dawkins 
and Manning 1998, p. 303). Three types of memories have been identified in chicks 
and rats – short-term, intermediate-term and long-term (Dawkins and Manning 
1998, p. 304). Not many people doubt that animals have memories but for those 
who doubt it I shall list a small number of examples. 
Birds have amazing memories for where they have hidden food. The Clark’s 
nutcracker (a type of crow) buries up to 30,000 pine seeds in the autumn in an area 
of 200 square miles and finds find over 90% of them during winter (Grandin 2005, 
p. 263). Marsh tits and chickadees may hide hundreds of seeds in one day and find 
them all days later (DeGrazia 1996, p. 159). The most parsimonious explanation for 
this is that they remember where they stored the food (DeGrazia 1996, p. 160).
Birds fly long distances when they migrate. The artic tern has the longest route – an 
18,000 mile round trip from the North Pole to the South Pole and back again 
(Grandin 2005, p. 285). Birds “have to learn these routes… they learn the routes 
with almost no effort at all [they only have to fly them once]” (Grandin 2005, p. 
285).
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Chimps can recognise individual people after many years absence (Fouts and Fouts 
1993, p. 37-8). There are carefully controlled studies showing the memory capacities 
of dolphins (Herman 1975, pp. 43-8; Herman and Thompson 1977, pp. 501-3). Gray 
squirrels bury hundreds of nuts in different places and remember each one 
(Grandin 2005, p. 287). Pigeons can “memorize hundreds of pictures and remember 
them months later” (Page 2001, p. 79). A “sheep can remember more than fifty 
members of its flock” (Page 2001, p. 177). Fish and reptiles will return to the place 
they spawned to mate. Octopi are good at remembering their way round mazes.
Most of these animals have to fend for themselves (i.e. migrate, store food etc.) well 
before age one. If memory is to count all who have a memory should count (at least 
to some extent). This includes not only mammals and birds below one but fish, 
reptiles and other vertebrates and some cephalopods (such as octopi) who have 
good memories. 
V. A Sense Of The Future, Including Their Own Future
Some deny animals have a sense of the future (Bennett 1988, p. 199; Wittgenstein 
1958, p. 650). Narveson implies having a sense of future requires being self-aware 
(1977, p. 166). But evolution gives us good reason to think conscious animals have a 
sense of time (DeGrazia 1996, p. 169). Anticipation is useful for predicting events 
and deciding what to do (Midgley 1983, p. 58). Grandin argues the “single most 
important thing emotions do for an animal is allow him to predict the future” (2005, 
p. 201). Apes use signs to refer to future events (Singer 1993, p. 112).
The capacity to experience fear suggests a sense of future because fear is fear of what 
may happen in the future (DeGrazia 1996, p. 170; Grandin 2005, p. 203). Likewise 
desire is future-oriented. There are studies that demonstrate mammals and birds 
represent temporal intervals (Allan & Gibbon 1984; Church & Gibbon 1992, pp. 23-
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540; Gallistel 1990; Gibbon 1977, pp. 279-335; Gill 1988; Killeen 1975, pp. 89-115). 
Animals can predict the future behaviour of conspecifics it is likely they can 
anticipate their own behaviour (Griffin 1976, p. 44).
Many experiments have demonstrated animals do appear to anticipate painful 
events:
Rats will learn to jump on sight of a warning light which indicates 
that an electric shock will follow shortly. Monkeys will stay awake 
(and develop stomach ulcers) in order to press levers on command to 
avoid painful shocks. (Rodd 1990, p. 131)
It is, therefore, reasonable to think some animals have a sense of the future (though 
Regan himself presents no empirical evidence for this).
VI. An Emotional Life
It used to be thought talking of animals in terms of emotions was just 
anthropomorphism. Even now some believe animals cannot have emotions because 
they cannot have beliefs (Frey 1980, p. 122). Animals’ behaviour used to be 
described solely in terms of instincts and drives (Grandin 2005, p. 136). Instincts 
are fixed action patterns and drives are built-in urges that make animals seek 
necessities like sex and food. The idea of instincts and drives seemed to explain 
animal behaviour from an external viewpoint. But the idea of a drive was 
problematic when it came to mapping the brain because single unified brain circuits 
that underlie particular drives could not be found (Panksepp 1998, p. 168). It was 
found that drives like hunger had two different circuits, one for physical aspects and 
the other for emotional aspects (Grandin 2005, p. 136). Physical aspects like bodily 
needs are not enough on their own. Animals (like people) need the emotion of 
seeking to motivate them to hunt or gather food. It is now commonly accepted that 
almost everything animals (and humans) do is driven by some kind of emotion/
feeling. 
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It is widely accepted by those who work with animals that “[m]ammals and birds 
have the same core feelings people do” (Grandin 2005, p. 88). In Grandin’s book 
she devotes three chapters to animal emotions. Animals are believed to have at least 
eight emotions: rage; prey chase drive; fear; curiosity; sexual attraction; separation 
distress; social attachment; play (2005, pp. 93-4; see also: Bateson 1972, pp. 38-9; 
Clark 1977, p. 101f; Darwin 1989, pp. 28-9, chaps. III and IV; Hare 1963, pp. 222-4; 
Harlow 1965, p. 90; Hebb 1946; Leahy 1991, p. 128; Midgley 1983, p. 57; Rachels 
1989, p. 215; Rodd 1990, p. 5; Scruton 2000, p. 15; Wittgenstein 1967, p. 486). More 
may yet be identified. Researchers are now discovering that lizards and snakes 
probably share most of these emotions (Grandin 2005, p. 88). For instance “snake 
mothers take care of their babies” (Grandin 2005, p. 88). There are several reasons 
for this. 
VI a. Evolution
Emotion has adaptive economy (Dawkins 2003, p. 97; DeGrazia 1996, p. 118; 
Grandin 2005, p. 95; Radcliffe Richards 2000, p. 64; Rolls 1999). Emotional 
responses are good at keeping animals safe. If a rat is shocked if it turns in a certain 
direction and then the experiment changes so it is shocked if it goes in the other 
direction the rat learns to do this. This cannot be accounted for by hard-wiring 
(Dawkins 2003, pp. 97-88). Because “[s]pecific rules (such as always turn right…) 
would be very much less effective than more general rules (repeat what leads to 
feeling better…)” (Dawkins 2003, p. 98). General emotional states are more effective 
at helping an animal adapt. Emotions are necessary because they reinforce learning 
(Dawkins 2003, p. 98).
Curiosity helps animals (and humans) find beneficial things like food and shelter 
and avoid dangerous things like predators (Grandin 2005, p. 95). This is supported 
by the fact our brains are relevantly similar to other animals (especially vertebrates), 
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for instance, the “part of the brain… associated with seeking is the hypothalamus – a 
part which we share with other mammals” (Grandin 2005, p. 95).
The hormones (oxytocin, and vasopressin) that control sex, motherhood fatherhood 
and love in humans (and other animals) are similar (only one amino acid different) 
to those that perform the same functions in frogs and other amphibians (Grandin 
2005, p. 106).
Love is not exclusive to humans “[a]nimals love other animals” (Grandin 2005, p. 
109). There are good evolutionary reasons to think animals experience social 
attachment; it is a survival mechanism, which evolved partly to keep warm (Grandin 
2005, p. 112). Nearly all mammals and probably most birds make friends (Grandin 
2005, p. 130; Rodd 1990, p. 62). Indeed, “virtually everything people and animals 
do is driven by some kind of feeling” (Grandin 2005, p. 136). 
VI b. Arguments against animal emotions
It has been argued the more complex emotions require language (Frey 1980, pp. 123-
4; Leahy 1991, p. 134; Scruton 2000, p. 14). Frey argues beliefs are part of emotions 
and this is demonstrated by the fact we can argue people out of their emotional 
responses (1980, p. 124). Because animals cannot use language, Frey argues, they 
cannot form beliefs and therefore cannot have emotions. It is not obvious beliefs 
require language. We can affect animals beliefs too, for example, we can train them 
not to be scared by showing them it is safe by rewarding them. Frey argues thoughts 
are insufficient for emotions because emotions require judgments (1980, p. 125). 
(Fortenbaugh argues something similar (1975, p. 26ff)). But there is a wealth of 
evidence that it does – as argued above many humans think without language.
Frey acknowledges some people have irrational fears which they cannot be argued 
out of, but, he says, “an understanding of them is possible, I think, only because we 
can stand back and contrast them with normal cases, where belief is present” (1980, 
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p. 124). Unfortunately, Frey does not offer any explanation of how the presence of 
beliefs in one case throws any light on the apparent lack of beliefs in the other. It is 
arguable the existence of such cases undermines Frey’s case especially as he does 
not explain how the idea beliefs are essential for emotions can accommodate cases 
where, as with irrational fears, there seems to be no belief upon which the emotion 
is based.
Frey argues that to feel emotions like shame requires judgments that require 
concepts that require language. Animals cannot use language and so cannot feel 
shame (1980, pp. 125-6). But even if shame does involve judgment it is not clear 
other emotions do.
If animals did not feel emotions in much the same way humans do it would make a 
mockery of experiments psychologists perform on animals. Such experiments 
assume animals, have a psychology that’s similar to ours (for examples see Sharpe 
1988, Ch. 6; Singer 1995, Ch. 2; Journal of Comparative and Physiological 
Psychology; Journal of Comparative Psychology). 
Thus, it is likely most animals experience emotions. But it is not just mammals and 
birds, the same reasons (evolutionary fitness and behavioural evidence) suggest all 
vertebrates experience emotions. If emotions matter morally Regan is epistemically 
irresponsible for overlooking the evidence vertebrates experience them.
VII. The Ability To Initiate Action In Pursuit Of Their 
Desires And Goals
If we are to show an individual acts intentionally we must show it is reasonable to 
view them as acting with the intention of achieving a given purpose (e.g. satisfying a 
desire) (Regan 1983, p. 74). Regan argues animals are autonomous:
if they have preferences and have the ability to initiate action with a 
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view to satisfying them… (let us call this preference autonomy)… the 
ability to initiate action because one has those desires or goals one 
has and believes, rightly or wrongly, that one’s desires or purpose will 
be satisfied or achieved by acting in a certain way. (1983, pp. 84-5)
Some think animals are agents in this sense ( DeGrazia 1996, p. 172; Elliot 1987, p. 
84. Some deny it: Frey 1987, p. 50; Kenny 1975, p. 19; Leahy 1991, p. 40). The fact 
animals use tools suggest intentional action. Some mammals (including the great 
apes, baboons, elephants) and birds do use rudimentary tools (See Darwin 2004, 
pp. 102-3; Wise 2000, pp. 190-4. A crow called Betty spontaneously bent a wire into 
a hook to get food out of a tube (Weir 2002, p. 981)). This is not to say those animals 
who do not use tools are not acting purposefully.
There are many examples of apparently intentional action. For example, some dogs 
have worked out how to cross roads safely (Marshall Thomas 1996). Some bulls are 
able to knock down fences without cutting themselves (Grandin 2005, p. 248). 
Plovers feign having an injured wing in order to draw predators away from their 
nests (Ristau 1992, p. 127). Another examples of an animal acting intentionally is a 
chimp waiting for an older to chimp to move so he can safely get a banana without 
being interfered with (Goodall 1971, p. 107). All these examples suggest animals do 
have preference autonomy.
The evidence that all vertebrates have beliefs and preferences is strong. Regan is 
epistemically irresponsible because he does not take this into account.
VIII. A Psychophysical Identity Over Time
Regan says, “we must assume… individuals, including both individual animals like 
Fido and individual human beings, retain their identity over time. The assumption… 
this is true in the case of human beings is common to all moral theories and begs no 
substantive moral question… Similarly, therefore, in assuming that the same is true 
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in the case of animals like Fido, no substantive moral question is begged” (1983, p. 
83). I agree this is a reasonable assumption because it is common to all theories and 
thus epistemically responsible.
IX. Epistemic Responsibility in General
What we claim to know about animals’ abilities should be based on the best 
available information. But even with this information we can never be certain. Thus, 
the more epistemic claims one makes the more risk there is that one is wrong. Those 
theories which make fewer epistemic claims are, therefore, more likely to be more 
epistemically responsible. Regan makes a lot of epistemic claims, some of which are 
quite controversial, making his account fairly risky from an epistemic point of view. 
Fox accuses Regan of epistemic irresponsibility (1978, p. 111).
X. Conclusion
I assessed the epistemic responsibility of Regan’s subjects-of-a-life account. All the 
evidence that suggests mammals are conscious have memories etc. suggests all 
vertebrates (and possibly some cephalopods) are. By ignoring this evidence Regan is 
being epistemically irresponsible. We can never be certain of our epistemic claims 
thus the more such claims we make the more risk we run of being wrong. Regan’s 
subjects-of-a-life criterion relies on a lot of empirical evidence (some of which is 
questionable). His account is thus risky from an epistemic point of view. 
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